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----------------------------------------------------------------ABSTRACT------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Any decentralised distributed network is particularly vulnerable to the Sybil attack wherein a malicious node 
masquerades as several different nodes, called Sybil nodes, simultaneously in an attempt to disrupt the proper 
functioning of the network. Such attacks may cause damage on a fairly large scale especially since they are 
difficult to detect and there has been no universally accepted scheme to counter them as yet. In this paper, we 
discuss the different kinds of Sybil attacks including those occurring in peer-to-peer reputation systems, self-
organising networks and even social network systems. In addition, various methods that have been suggested over 
time to decrease or eliminate their risk completely are also analysed along with their modus operandi. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A Sybil attack [1] is one in which a malicious node 
on a network illegitimately claims to be several different 
nodes simultaneously. If an entity on a network does not 
have physical knowledge of the other entities, it will 
perceive them purely as informational abstractions called 
identities. 
Sybil attacks occur when the one-to-one correspondence 
between an entity and its identity is violated. 
They affect a number of environments and application 
domains in a variety of ways. For instance, the reputation 
system of a P2P network may be compromised as the 
attacker is able to favourably alter reputation scores by 
the use of the newly created rogue identities. In the worst 
case scenario, an attacker can create an infinite number of 
forged identities with just one physical device [11].  
 
2. SPECIFIC TYPES OF SYBIL ATTACKS 
There are numerous malicious applications of Sybil 
attacks in different environments such as those including, 
but not limited to, the variations enlisted below. 
 
2.1 Routing 
Sybil attacks can disrupt routing protocols in ad hoc 
networks, especially the multicast routing mechanism. 
Separate paths that initially seem disjoint may pass 
through the Sybil nodes of a single attacker. Another 
vulnerable concept is Geographical routing where 
malicious nodes may appear at more than one place at a 
time [4]. 
An attack in an ad hoc network and thus the availability 
of fake identities may further lead to a large scale attack 
such as distributed DoS, in addition to the inherently 
insecure routing protocols in such networks [12]. 
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2.2 Tampering with Voting and Reputation Systems 
In case of any environment where there is a voting 
scheme in place for purposes such as reporting and 
identifying node misbehaviour in the system, updating 
reputation scores and so on, a Sybil attack may be 
particularly dangerous. As an example, an attacker may 
create enough malicious identities to repeatedly report 
and subsequently remove legitimate nodes from the 
network. Alternatively, these malicious nodes can protect 
themselves from ever being removed as they are in 
collusion. 
  
2.3 Fair Resource Allocation 
Sybil attacks may also be used to enable the attacker to 
obtain an unfair and disproportionately large share of 
resources that were intended to be distributed amongst all 
nodes on the network equally. This attack denies 
legitimate nodes their deserved share of resources and 
also provides the malicious node with more avenues for 
other attacks. 
2.4 Distributed Storage 
File storage systems in peer-to-peer and wireless sensor 
networks can be compromised by the Sybil attack. This is 
achieved by defeating the fragmentation and replication 
processes in the file system. A system can be tricked into 
storing data into the multiple Sybil identities of the same 
node on the network. 
2.5 Data Aggregation 
Sensor network readings are computed by query protocols 
[13] in a network rather than returning the reading of each 
individual sensor. This is done to conserve energy. Sybil 
identities may be able to report incorrect sensor readings 
thereby influencing the overall computed aggregate. A 
malicious user may be able to significantly alter the 
aggregate with enough identities. 
 
3. METHODS PROPOSED TO COUNTER SYBIL 
ATTACKS                         
Though there is no general, universally-accepted solution 
to the Sybil attack, a number of approaches for various 
combinations of environments and attacks have been 
proposed. Some methods mitigate the threat level of these 
attacks in a system to a satisfactory minimum without 
incurring an appreciable performance overhead. We must 
note that although they will not completely eliminate the 
possibility of the attack occurring, they are more than 
worthy of consideration. 
Notable techniques to counter Sybil attacks are as under. 
    
3.1 Trusted Certification 
Certification is by far the most frequently cited solution to 
defeating Sybil attacks [5]. It involves the presence of a 
trusted certifying authority (CA) that validates the one is 
to one correspondence between an entity on the network 
and its associated identity. This centralised CA thus 
eliminates the problem of establishing a trust relationship 
between two communicating nodes. Douceur has proven 
that such kind of certification is the only method that may 
potentially eliminate Sybil attacks completely [1]. 
Although this approach intuitively seems like the ideal 
method to tackle these attacks, there are a number of 
implementation issues specifically about how the CA 
shall establish the entity-identity mapping. In real-world 
applications this may incur an appreciable performance 
cost particularly if performed manually on large scale 
systems.  
3.2 Resource Testing 
Resource Testing is the most commonly implemented 
solution to averting Sybil attacks. The basic principle is 
that the quantum of computing resources of each entity on 
the network is limited. A verifier then checks whether 
each identity has as many resources as the single physical 
device it is associated with. Any discrepancy indicates the 
possibility of a compromised node. Storage, computation 
and communication were initially proposed as resources. 
However, for a system such as a wireless sensor network, 
an attacker might have storage and computation resources 
in large capacities compared to resource-starved sensor 
nodes. Alternatively, verification messages for verifying 
communication resources might flood the entire system 
itself. Hence, all three are inadequate choices for sensor 
networks. 
Radio resource testing, proposed by Newsome et al. in 
[6], is an extension of the resource testing verification 
method for wireless sensor networks. The key 
assumptions of this approach are that any physical device 
has only one radio and that this radio is incapable of 
transmitting and receiving messages on more than one 
channel at any given time. 
Resource tests have been suggested by many as a minimal 
defence against Sybil attacks where the goal is to reduce 
their risk substantially rather than to eliminate it 
altogether. 
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3.3 Recurring Costs 
This method is a variation of resource testing where 
resource tests are conducted after specific time intervals 
to impose a certain “cost” on the attacker that is incurred 
for every identity that he controls or introduces into the 
network. 
However a number of researchers that have endorsed this 
method [7, 8, 9] have used computational power in their 
resource tests. This in itself may be inadequate in 
controlling the attack since a malicious user incurs only a 
one-time cost (for computing resources) that may be 
recovered via the execution of the attack itself, as pointed 
out by Levine et al. in [5]. In [10] the authors make use of 
an economic model to propose a critical value that exists 
for a particular combination of application domain and 
attacker objective. An attack is deemed successful only if 
ratio of the attacker’s objective value to the cost per 
identity exceeds this critical value. They conclude that 
using recurring costs or fees per identity is more effective 
as a deterrent to Sybil attacks than a one-time resource 
test. 
3.4 Privilege Attenuation 
 
In [16], Fong considers a different kind of Sybil attack 
altogether – one that is distinct from others that plague 
peer-to-peer and reputation systems. This attack aims to 
create pseudonymous or fake identities in a Social 
Network System (SNS) and get them to collude to 
favourably alter the existing trust relationships in the 
network. These relationships are represented via a graph-
theoretic relationship model that exists between the owner 
of a resource and a prospective accessor of the same 
resource and is called a social graph.  Such models are 
common in quite a few popular Social Network Systems 
such as Facebook. Access control policies are as defined 
by the respective SNSes themselves. This concept of 
relationship-based access control (ReBARC) [18, 19, 20, 
21] is the basis for authorization decisions in the system. 
 
When the counterfeit identities or fake accounts in the 
SNS collude, they may gain the ability to access personal, 
sensitive and restricted user information or perform large-
scale crawls on the social graph [17]. Weakly configured 
access control policies on SNSes render them vulnerable 
to such attacks [1]. 
  
To counter this threat, Fong has proposed a particular 
version of Denning’s Principle of Privilege Attenuation or 
POPA that is both a necessary and sufficient condition to 
thwart such attacks, along with a static policy analysis for 
verifying POPA compliance [16]. 
 
3.5 Incentive-based Detection 
Margolin and Levine propose a protocol in [22] called 
Informant that is based on an economic incentive policy 
and is a general solution that is not specific to any 
particular application domain. An entity (called the 
detective) rewards Sybils for revealing themselves. An 
identity gives the name of the target peer and a security 
deposit to the detective while the target peer receives the 
deposit and a certain reward. A Dutch auction is used to 
establish the minimum reward that will reveal a Sybil 
node. No physical tokens are required such as radios and 
clock skews unlike other Sybil detection approaches [3, 
22, 23]. 
3.6 Location / Position Verification   
This solution is specific to Wireless ad hoc Networks. 
Methods employing this technique make use of the fact 
that any identities that are projected by any single 
physical device must be in the same location. Locations 
are verified using specific methods such as triangulation 
[25]. So for an attacker with a single physical device, all 
Sybil identities will be in the same place or will appear to 
move together. 
Tangpong et al. have proposed a solution in [24] based on 
the above strategy. 
3.7 RSSI-based scheme 
In [14], Demirbas and Song introduce a method for Sybil 
detection based on the Received Signal Strength Indicator 
(RSSI) of messages. The cooperation of one additional 
node (and hence one message communication) is required 
for the proper functioning of this protocol. A localisation 
algorithm is used in this scheme Sybil attacks can be 
detected with a completeness of 100% with few false 
positive alerts. Despite the fact that RSSI is unreliable and 
that transmissions via radio are non-isotropic, the use of 
ratios of RSSIs from multiple receivers solves this 
problem. 
3.8 Random Key Predistribution 
This technique enables nodes on a wireless sensor 
network to establish secure links for communicating with 
each other [15].  In random key predistribution, a set of 
keys are assigned at random to a node enabling it to 
discover or compute the common keys that it shares with 
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its neighbouring nodes. Node-to-node secrecy is ensured 
by using the common keys as a shared secret session key. 
The main ideas are the association of the identity with the 
key assigned to a node and the validation of the key. 
Validation involves ensuring that the network is able to 
validate the keys that an identity might have. The forged 
Sybil identity will not pass the key validation test as the 
keys associated with a random identity will most likely, 
not have an appreciable intersection with the 
compromised key set. 
 
Table I: Various approaches to tackle Sybil attacks in different application domains and their limitations 
 
S. No. Technique to mitigate Sybil attack Disadvantages / Limitations Application Domain 
1 Trusted Certification 
Significant performance overhead 
and expense [1][6][4] 
General 
2 Resource Testing 
Ineffective for most systems 
[1][6][4] 
General 
3 Recurring Fees 
Requires the use 
of electronic cash or of significant 
human effort [7] 
General 
4 Privilege Attenuation 
Only applies to monotonic 
policies. Significant run-time and 
storage overhead for generalised 
extensions of the idea [16] 
Social Network Systems 
5 Economic Incentives 
May encourage Sybil attackers 
that have no interest in subverting 
the application protocols, but that 
are interested in being paid to 
reveal their presence [26] 
General 
6 Location/Position Verification Limited only to ad hoc networks Wireless ad hoc networks 
7 
Received Signal Strength 
Indicator (RSSI) – based scheme 
Does not deal with existing Sybil 
nodes in the network, Location 
calculations are costly, Limited to 
Sensor Networks 
Sensor Networks 
8 Random Key Predistribution Limited to Sensor Networks [2] Sensor Networks 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have discussed the important kinds 
of Sybil attacks that can be launched on various 
application domains. We have also listed notable 
methods that have been proposed over time to tackle 
these attacks. Further, we have elaborated on their 
modus operandi, advantages, and limitations. TABLE 
I at the end of section 3 summarizes this. 
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